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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the term “nuclear disarmament” within Art. VI of 
the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it offers 
a new interpretation that accepts as compliance a full spectrum of partial 
disarmament steps. Historically, the U.S. legal position has emphasized the 
view that the NPT fails to require more than the pursuit of nuclear 
disarmament talks. This view has contributed to a disarmament process that 
many states characterize as too slow and too slight. This Article proposes 
that a shift in emphasis, from an occasional pursuit of negotiations, to a 
more ongoing and detailed discussion of potential measures, should 
neutralize this complaint and yet preserve U.S. flexibility. This outcome 
would better position the U.S. to address its most urgent nonproliferation 
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concerns. In short, this Article examines a term that American scholars and 
practitioners have neglected in an important respect, and it provides an 
understanding of that term beyond what other legal writers have offered, 
with significant diplomatic and strategic implications.  
INTRODUCTION
From the vantage point of 2011, a torrent of nuclear arms curtailment 
proposals now surges forth from a series of news articles penned by four 
distinguished statesmen.1 Though radical, the principles enumerated therein 
have since gained currency across the political spectrum, in the U.S. and 
abroad.2 Such momentum3 offers perhaps some hope for movement on our 
most urgent nonproliferation matters.4 This paper explores the important 
linkage between the success of U.S. nonproliferation efforts and the 
perception of U.S. conduct under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).5
This linkage has two aspects. First, other states find it difficult to support 
U.S. nonproliferation efforts, because America is perceived as avoiding its 
 1. See MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, A SKEPTIC’S CASE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 1-2, 
145 n.1 (2010) (describing the Global Zero movement initiated by one hundred signatories in 
Paris in 2009, President Obama’s 2009 speech on in Prague, U.S. and Russian reductions 
under the New START Treaty, and an arguably lesser reliance on nuclear forces in the April 
2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review). See, e.g., George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. 
Kissinger & Sam Nunn, A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at 
A15; Shultz et al., Toward A Nuclear-Free World, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A13; 
Shultz, et al., How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A17; 
Shultz et al., Deterrence In The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2011, at 
A15.  
 2. See Strobe Talbot, Foreword to O’HANLON, supra note 1, at 3. 
 3. See Compliance and Growth—NPT Review Conferences—2010 REVIEW
Conference, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter04_01.html#2010 (last visited April 6, 
2011) (“While some disappointment continues to exist . . . with regard to lack of a more 
concrete commitment . . . , it was obvious that the change of U.S. policy was directly 
reflected in the result of the disarmament action agenda. Moreover, pursuing policies to 
achieve a world without nuclear weapons was articulated in the first action item.”).  
 4. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Pakistan Doubles Its Arsenal: As India is Surpassed 
by Rival, U.S. Faces a Diplomatic Quandary, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, A1, 10 (discussing 
the South Asian arms race; U.S. economic, political, and defense ties with India; the 
Pakistani role in the U.S. war in Afghanistan; and U.S. nonproliferation concerns) 
(“Adoption of . . . the ‘fissile materials cutoff treaty’ . . . requires international consensus . . . 
[and] ‘[p]atience is running out.’”).  
 5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR 
AND CONTEST: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 529 (2008) (“The states of 
consent must conform their strategic behavior to the rule of law; and the law to which they 
conform must be reformed to take into account changes in the strategic context.”). This 
linkage reflects “the growing union of strategy and law,” despite the emphasis, here, on 
clarification rather than reform. Id. at 545.  
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own disarmament obligations under NPT Article VI.6 Second, negotiated 
reductions and other measures not only satisfy such obligations, but 
diminish the probability of accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized use.7 Thus, 
properly understood, Article VI contains the key not only to removal of this 
diplomatic stumbling block but to an improved security environment.8
Indeed, this paper will consider the impact of such measures on U.S. 
alliances and security guarantees, recalling that the status quo carries its 
own pronounced risks.9
Here, it is necessary to emphasize four limitations to the scope of this 
undertaking. First, this paper does not argue that satisfaction of the 
complaint of U.S. non-performance under the NPT will beget automatic 
progress on U.S. nonproliferation concerns. However, it should neutralize 
that complaint, which has been used with some success to deflect U.S. 
nonproliferation concerns.10 Thus, to the extent that the U.S. can be seen as 
living up to its obligations under the NPT, the odds of addressing U.S. 
nonproliferation concerns necessarily improve. 
Second, this paper’s investigation into the meaning and interpretation of 
Article VI is not, in an important sense, complete. Though authoritative, the 
sources canvassed in support of this interpretation are limited to those 
printed in the English language, while the Chinese, French, Russian, and 
Spanish versions of the treaty are equally authoritative.11 Nevertheless, the 
interpretation set forth here must inform subsequent Article VI analysis.12
Third, though the “nuclear disarmament” prong of Art. VI has not 
received intense scrutiny, the same cannot be said for Article VI as a 
whole.13 Rather than recast the entire provision, this paper seeks instead to 
clarify this particular facet. Fourth, the conclusions reached in this paper are 
 6. Andrew Grotto, Why Do States That Oppose Nuclear Proliferation Resist New 
Nonproliferation Obligations?: Three Logics of Nonproliferation Decision-making, 18 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2010); Graham Allison, Thinking About Zero, in
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION 5, 10 (2010) Shultz et al., Deterrence In 
The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1, at 2. 
 7. Shultz, et al., Deterrence In The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1, at 2. 
 8. See Allison, Thinking About Zero, supra note 6, at 11 (“To be preferable to the 
current path, an alternative has only to have a higher expected value than the near certainty 
of the spread and use of nuclear weapons in regional wars and by terrorists . . . .”). 
 9. See Shultz et al., Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1, at 
1 (“It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear 
superpowers during the Cold War . . . . The growing number of nations with nuclear arms 
and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and 
increased instability.”). 
 10. See Allison, supra note 6, at 10.  
 11. NPT, supra note 5, art. XI. 
 12. The English version is, after all, authoritative in its own right. 
 13. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of 
the NPT, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 3 (2007); David Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has 
the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 WIS. L.
REV. 301 (1993). 
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aimed to encourage, but not resolve, the inquiry into how much 
nonproliferation progress to expect in return for reductions of varying sizes. 
With these objectives and limits in mind, Part II will introduce the NPT, 
posit an interpretation of Article VI, and summarize the implications of this 
interpretation for recent and longstanding nonproliferation initiatives, U.S. 
security guarantees, and U.S. strategy going forward. Part III subjects this 
interpretation to legal analysis under relevant principles of international law. 
Part IV concludes with a final, overarching policy rationale for accepting 
some meaningful reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Basic Bargain in the NPT 
Signed in 1968, the NPT entered into force in 1970. “The basic pact is 
simple: 183 nations have pledged never to acquire nuclear weapons; in 
addition, the five nuclear powers recognized by the treaty . . . have 
committed to reduce and eventually eliminate their arsenals.”14 Though the 
draft originally tabled by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. lacked a provision so 
committing the nuclear-weapon-states (NWS), Mexico and other non-
nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS) insisted on the inclusion of one.15 Thus, 
both NWS and NNWS have obligations under the treaty.16
B. The Meaning of “nuclear disarmament” in Article VI  
Article VI provides that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation 
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on 
a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.”17 On its face, Article VI applies to all states parties, 
which undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to, among other things, “nuclear disarmament.” As a state party to 
the NPT, therefore, the U.S. must pursue talks on measures relating to 
nuclear disarmament.18 To the extent it does not, America will find itself in 
 14. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 30 (2007); but c.f. Memorandum from Spurgeon Keeny for Dr. Henry Kissinger 
(Jan. 24, 1969) (on file with U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian), 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve02/d2 (describing Article VI as 
“an essentially hortatory statement”).  
15. CIRINCIONE, supra note 14, at 30-31.  
 16. See id. 
 17. NPT supra note 5, art. VI. 
 18. “Negotiations” and “good faith” are terms of art in this context. See generally 
Scott Sagan, Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS: A DEBATE 203 (George Perkovich and James Acton eds., Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 2009). 
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potentially unsanctioned noncompliance, availing its opponents of a similar 
foothold. The task, then, is to determine the meaning of “nuclear 
disarmament” and what conduct will satisfy its strictures, to deprive states 
parties of such traction.  
In usual parlance, “nuclear disarmament” is susceptible to at least two 
meanings: it can refer to one or more acts of partial disarmament, or to an 
end state of total disarmament. Article VI allows for both, for the following 
reasons. Total disarmament requires, as a practical matter, prior acts of 
partial disarmament.19 Moreover, the notion that partial measures might be 
recognized as necessary but insufficient to satisfy Article VI contravenes its 
very text, which merely requires the good faith negotiation of “effective 
measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament.” One cannot well argue that 
“measures relating to … nuclear disarmament” exclude negotiated, effective 
partial disarmament steps.  
This paper provides legal grounds for ensuring satisfaction of Article VI 
through negotiated reductions in nuclear armament. Such reductions might 
aim for fewer total warheads, fewer weapons on alert status, and lower 
overkill ratios. Compliance with Article VI does not demand total 
disarmament. To be sure, total disarmament would satisfy the “nuclear 
disarmament” prong of Article VI, but other disarmament measures can do 
so as well. With such common-sense legal support, and the prospect of 
further reductions, a political commitment to achieve greater progress in this 
area, and the current record of U.S. disarmament,20 this interpretation should 
enjoy a substantial probability of widespread acceptance by other states.  
Part III subjects this interpretation to the necessary legal analysis, but for 
now it is useful to acknowledge its security and policy implications. Besides 
contributing to the disposal of unwanted diplomatic baggage, these 
measures hold additional strategic implications that deserve mention. They 
doubtless affect recent and longstanding nonproliferation efforts, bi- and 
multilateral security relationships, and U.S. grand strategy. It should go 
without saying that the wisdom of the proposals enumerated here depends 
on whether the benefit they stand to produce overwhelms any detriment in 
these areas.  
C. Implications for Nonproliferation Initiatives 
To begin with, the impact of reductions and this interpretation of Article 
VI on longstanding nonproliferation efforts, such as the Comprehensive 
 19. Logically, the former cannot occur without the latter.  
 20. Allison, Thinking About Zero, at 13 (“Since these arsenals peaked at more than 
68,000 during the Cold War, they have been cut by almost two-thirds to approximately 
23,000 warheads today. The New START Treaty . . . will reduce active strategic warheads to 
1,550 on each side. . . . “). 
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Test Ban Treaty21 and the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,22 should 
prove positive. Following through on partial reductions should help sustain 
momentum. Moreover, the prospect of concluding these treaties should take 
some pressure off of total nuclear disarmament for a meaningful period of 
time. However, balance is critical. The faster that reductions take place, the 
more reluctant states may grow with respect to progress on the CTBT and 
FMCT, for the simple reason that governments may prefer to preserve 
flexibility.23 This tension takes on special significance for those trying to 
chart a course to a world without nuclear weapons.24
The interpretation of Article VI espoused in this paper should not 
negatively impact the thrust of Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn’s 
proposal, for the simple reason that both are realistic, pragmatic, and 
carefully wrought. Indeed, a trajectory of partial disarmament steps and 
reductions is most of what these statesmen seek.25 Moreover, their “vision” 
of zero nuclear weapons is better understood as a vehicle for lessening 
present danger than as a short-term objective.26
In addition, they wish to ensure the quality of existing nuclear stockpiles, 
which grows all the more important as reductions occur.27 Further, the 
difficulty of practical maneuvers that must occur closer to zero should not 
 21. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 
[hereinafter CTBT]. 
 22. See, e.g., Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/fmctorg.htm [hereinafter FMCT]. 
 23. Fred C. Iklé, Nuclear Abolition, A Reverie, NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 25, 2009, 
at 4-5, (“[O]nce the largest nuclear arsenals have been shrunk so much, the small arsenals of 
North Korea, Iran and other countries will become a more powerful military asset.”). 
 24. Indeed, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn state that “as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile primarily to deter 
attack and to reassure our allies through extended deterrence.” Shultz et al., Deterrence In 
The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1. Admittedly, this statement creates some 
circularity: nuclear weapons will exist as long as America retains such a stockpile, and as 
long as America retains a stockpile, nuclear weapons will exist. To be fair, prior liquidation 
of others’ nuclear weapons dismisses this conceptual difficulty, but not the practical one.  
 25. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1 (“Although 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid 
of all nuclear weapons, they did . . . initiate[] steps leading to significant reductions in 
deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire 
class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and 
Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical 
steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address 
the challenge posed by these two questions.” Id.
 26. Id. (“Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or 
urgent.”); see also Shultz et al., Toward A Nuclear-Free World, supra note 1 (quoting then-
Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Margaret Beckett: “‘What we need is both a vision—a 
scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons—and action—progressive steps to reduce 
warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two 
strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing.’”). 
 27. If we have fewer on which to depend, they better function well. See generally 
Shultz et al., How To Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent, supra note 1.  
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stall current progress on the margins.28 Finally, their observation that 
nuclear weapons failed to deter major wars during the Cold War, and their 
concordant willingness to explore “[t]he role of non- nuclear means of 
deterrence to … prevent conflict and increase stability in troubled regions . . 
.[,]” demonstrate a clear-eyed appreciation for the importance of security 
relationships and other means of projecting power to international relations, 
and by extension, this endeavor.29 Forewarning that the U.S. “must not 
reduce its nuclear forces too fast” is hardly inconsistent with this proposal.30
D. Implications for International Security Arrangements 
The implications of reductions and Article VI compliance are perhaps 
more significant regarding security relationships. U.S. security guarantees 
and alliances played a leading role in persuading other states to forego 
nuclear weapons in the first place.31 For states in strategically important 
regions plagued by violent conflict, a diminution in U.S. nuclear capabilities 
could reverse this state of affairs.32 Reductions must not risk the tremendous 
worth of these relationships.33 However, extending security guarantees to 
problem states could spur progress in key regions, such as South Asia, 
Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East.34 That said, such an 
extension could stress existing relationships, perhaps to their breaking point. 
As such, the value of reductions and the value of additional security 
guarantee vary directly with how successful existing and emerging great 
powers are in coordinating their efforts.35 Also, increasing multi-polarity 
could very well complicate matters.36 Great powers will tend to avoid 
 28. See supra notes 23-25; see generally Shultz et al., Deterrence in the Age of 
Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of fewer nuclear materials 
across the board to: diminished first-strike incentives; and lower probability of catastrophe 
due to accident, mistake, and terror). 
 29. Shultz et al., Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1. 
 30. Iklé, supra note 23, at 3; see infra text accompanying note 116.  
 31. See CIRINCIONE, supra note 14, at 31, 54, 104.  
 32. See Joseph Nye, Jr., Op-Ed., Obama’s Nuclear Agenda, DAILY TIMES (Pakistan), 
Oct. 13, 2009.  
 33. See CIRINCIONE, supra note 14, at 54-55. 
 34. See Iklé, supra note 23, at 3 (“Our diplomacy might have to insulate states from 
nuclear warfare.”). 
 35. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 79 (1994) (describing Great Power 
coordination after the Congress of Vienna, where “Europe experienced the longest period of 
peace it had ever known. No war at all took place among the Great Powers for forty years, 
and after the Crimean War in 1854, no general war for another sixty.”); see also Shultz et al., 
Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation , supra note 1 (“Achieving deterrence with 
assured security will require work by leaders and citizens on a range of issues . . . . Changes 
to extended deterrence must be developed over time by the U.S. and allies working closely 
together. Reconciling national perspectives on nuclear deterrence is a challenging problem, 
and comprehensive solutions must be developed.”). 
 36. See Shultz, et al., Deterrence In The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1. 
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security arrangements that impinge on what they perceive as their spheres of 
interest. Furthermore, great powers’ regional security interests are not 
always reconcilable. To the extent such tendencies block desirable security 
arrangements in a particular region, limited NWS arms reductions may 
prove the ceiling—and not a gateway—for nonproliferation progress.37
Multi-polarity also begs serious questions as to the wisdom of nuclear 
arms curtailment in general. One might plausibly wonder how America can 
afford to relinquish any nuclear weapons when and as the potential for great 
power conflict may be increasing.38 Yet, the differential between American 
and competing nuclear arsenals is, as of this moment, so wide that the U.S. 
can presently afford to trade weapons for the opportunity to favorably 
circumscribe the future nuclear field of action.39 Therefore, limited 
reductions should proceed in the near-term, with the prospect of deeper 
reductions in the future depending, among other things, on the effectiveness 
of great power coordination.40
As stated at the outset, this section has posited a general interpretation of 
Article VI, and paused to consider its implications for various 
nonproliferation initiatives, recent and longstanding. In addition, it has 
touched upon concerns that reductions pose for existing U.S. security 
guarantees. Part III subjects Article VI to interpretation under international 
law, and it is that discussion to which we now turn.  
II. DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, the objective of any attempt to interpret a provision of an 
international convention is to decide, as would an independent international 
tribunal.41 Of course, for the purpose of achieving some level of certainty 
with respect to an agreed upon provision, states parties would generally not 
wish to place the full weight of their respective obligations on the discretion 
 37. This is not to say that grounds do not exist for such progress. See PHILIP 
BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 312 (2002) 
(“More than any other state in the world, [China] has grounds for alarm at the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.”).  
 38. Although what states are and are not so-called “great powers” is susceptible to 
reasoned disagreement, Michael Klare considers the following either existing or evolving 
great powers: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, the U.S. See generally 
MICHAEL T. KLARE, RISING POWERS, SHRINKING PLANET (2008).  
 39. This is arguably the most fundamental point made by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, 
and Nunn. It might be argued further that U.S. superiority will not prove so enduring as to 
recommend against looking for ways to convert it into real security gain. See infra text 
accompanying note 116.  
 40. See BOBBITT, supra note 37, at 160-75; see also KISSINGER, supra note 35, at 76-
77, 78-102. 
 41. RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 110 (2008) (“The test which 
many lawyers use in giving advice on matters of international law is what an independent 
tribunal would find the law to be.”). 
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of such a tribunal.42 It would be preferable that the content of a provision 
would flow as much as possible from the direct application of settled 
principles of treaty interpretation.43 Though elusive, this ideal should prove 
useful to bear in mind while applying the rules of interpretation found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).44
A. Applicability and Rules of the Vienna Convention  
Although applicability of the VCLT to agreements concluded by the U.S. 
government is not in every case a certainty, it is generally perceived as 
such.45 The VCLT provides that pacta sunt servanda: “treaties are binding 
on the parties and must be performed in good faith.”46 Further, Articles 31 
and 32 set forth explicit rules of interpretation. Article 31 provides, in 
relevant part, the general rule that a treaty must be interpreted “in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”47 The “context” 
comprises the treaty’s text, preamble, and annexes.48 In addition, “any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions . . . shall be taken into account, 
together with the context.”49
For its part, Article 32 lists “supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion.”50 Such means may be used to either “confirm the meaning 
resulting from . . . Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to Article 31 . . . leaves [it] ambiguous or obscure; 
or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”51 Notably, 
parties’ preference for certainty corresponds with an implicit partiality 
 42. See id. at 29 (describing the VCLT as providing a nuanced “single route” to a 
hard conclusion, as regards treaty interpretation).  
 43. See id.
 44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. Notably, the U.S. is not party to the VCLT; however, the U.S. views 
much of it as customary international law. Office of the Legal Advisor, Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited July 13, 2011). 
 45. See BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A BRADLEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (4th ed., 2003) [hereinafter CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW]. Moreover, applicability of the VCLT is “axiomatic” in cases before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as arbitral bodies 
constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See GARDINER,
supra note 41, at 15.  
 46. See CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 104 (citing VCLT art. 26).  
 47. VCLT supra note 44, art. 31. 
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
 50. Id., art. 32.  
 51. Id.
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within the VCLT for relying principally on the general rule in Article 31.52
To that end, the operation of Article 31 is one of “progressive 
encirclement,”53 or a cycle through considerations of ordinary meaning, 
context, and the treaty’s object and purpose, which iteratively closes in upon 
the proper interpretation.54 Thus, the terms and their ordinary meaning are 
“the starting point” the context “moderat[es] selection of that meaning;” and 
“the object and purpose illuminat[e] the process.”55
Returning to the provision at hand, Article VI provides: “Each of the 
Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”56 A natural 
reading reveals an undertaking with the following structure:57
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith 
• on effective measures relating  
– to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and  
– to nuclear disarmament, and  
• on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control. 
The use of the prepositions “to” and “on” renders this sensible.58 In 
addition, that a comma separates out the undertaking to pursue negotiations 
in good faith “on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament” means 
that that undertaking must be distinguished from the pursuit of good faith 
negotiations “on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament.” 
Though the meaning of Article VI in its entirety is in one sense beyond the 
 52. The VCLT does not in all cases privilege any of the factors within Article 31 or 
32, except that Article 31 provides the initial inquiry, while Article 32 provides secondary 
“supplementary means.” See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 10; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 91-92. 
 53. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 141-42.  
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 144.  
 56. NPT, supra note 5, art. VI. 
 57. According to the principle of “actuality” or “textuality,” treaties are to be 
interpreted primarily as they stand, and on the basis of their actual texts. GARDINER, supra 
note 41, at 63-64. Similarly, “the principle of natural and ordinary meaning” provides for 
words and phrases to be given their normal, natural and unstrained meaning. Id.
 58. Though not to be exclusively relied upon, grammar and syntax can prove 
essential to interpretation. See id. at 178, 187. Cf. Review Conference of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 5-30, 1975, Final Document, at 7, 
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF /35/I, Annex I (May 30, 1975), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1975%20-%20Geneva%20-
%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 1975 Final Document]. 
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scope of this paper, the relation of the term “nuclear disarmament” to the 
Article as a whole nonetheless affects its meaning.  
B. VCLT Article 31—Ordinary Meaning and Context 
Applying Article 31, the ordinary meaning of “nuclear disarmament” 
could be two different things: (1) disarmament of the entirety of the parties’ 
nuclear weapons arsenals; or (2) the act of disarming such arsenals.59
“Nuclear disarmament” could therefore require negotiations of total nuclear 
disarmament, partial disarmament steps, or both. If both, then the good faith 
pursuit of negotiations on effective measures relating to either one could 
satisfy the “nuclear disarmament” component of Article VI.60 Here, 
therefore, is the VCLT’s “starting point.”61 The next task is to examine as 
context the remaining treaty language to “moderate” that meaning.62
Looking to the remainder of the NPT, no other article sheds light on the 
meaning of “nuclear disarmament.” Article VII provides that nothing in the 
NPT affects the right of any states parties to conclude other regional treaties 
“to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories.”63 “Total absence” indicates a permissible objective but of other 
treaties, not the NPT or Article VI in particular. While it would be strange 
to permit an objective inconsistent with the purposes of the NPT, the 
conclusion of regional nuclear-free zones is not necessarily inconsistent 
with a requirement that states parties engage in disarmament steps. Thus, we 
are left with the Preamble.64
 59. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 161 (“The difficulty [with ordinary meaning] is that 
almost any word has more than one meaning. The word ‘meaning’ itself has at least sixteen 
different meanings.”). Nevertheless, “[o]ne has to start somewhere . . . [and this] almost 
axiomatically involves giving them the meaning which the reader takes to be usual.” Id. at 
162.  
 60. That “nuclear disarmament” is a disjunctive requirement that obliges states to 
engage in either partial or total disarmament is crucial in this regard. If the term were 
conjunctive, that is, if both total disarmament and partial disarmament were necessary to 
satisfy this requirement, there would be no point in allowing room for partial disarmament in 
the first place. Accordingly, the very allowance of partial disarmament measures entails that 
either total or partial measures satisfy this prong of Article VI.  
 61. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 62. See id.; see also GARDINER, supra note 41, 59-60, 63 (discussing the primacy of 
the text, and, the context as extending beyond a particular part of the instrument to the whole 
instrument). 
 63. NPT, supra note 5, art. VII.  
 64. The NPT itself lacks annexes, rendering that source of interpretation under 
VCLT Article 31 inapplicable in this case. It is also important to note that a preamble 
typically lacks specific, legally binding obligations, containing instead aspirational 
statements relating to performance of the obligations set forth in the body of the treaty. See 
VCLT, supra note 44, art. 31(2); see also DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR 
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 29 (2011).  
392 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
The pertinent preambular language includes a declaration of “intention to 
achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”65
Thus, the states parties declared their intent to stop the arms race and to take 
measures “in the direction of nuclear disarmament.” Certainly, “measures in 
the direction of nuclear disarmament” cannot be read to exclude reductions 
in nuclear armament. More broadly, this declaration of intent cannot but 
reflect a precise understanding of the states parties at signing, that 
intermediate steps would be required before reaching an end state of total 
nuclear disarmament. Finally, although “nuclear disarmament,” here, could 
very well refer exclusively to this end state, it could just as well refer to 
partial reductions.  
The preamble also includes a desire to “facilitate . . . the liquidation of all 
. . . existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear 
weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control . . . . “ 
To be sure, this language provides much to analyze, but for now it suffices 
to observe (1) that the states parties explicitly included their desire to 
achieve total nuclear disarmament, and (2) that this statement used terms 
other than “nuclear disarmament.” Thus, this language provides for a 
desirable trajectory and end state, but not necessarily anything more.66
Furthermore, the very different—and physically separate—treatment 
given to “nuclear disarmament” versus “liquidation,” “elimination,” and 
“general and complete disarmament” indicates that these could be 
overlapping but not coextensive or coterminous concepts. Any divergence 
would provide “context” for understanding Article VI, and reflect the two-
fold meaning of “nuclear disarmament” in Article VI. Indeed, this aspect of 
the Preamble could demonstrate that the states parties intended partial 
disarmament steps to satisfy the “nuclear disarmament prong of Article VI.  
C. Object and Purpose 
The object and purpose of the NPT must now be considered to shed 
further light on the ordinary meaning of “nuclear disarmament.” Object and 
purpose are in fact two different things: the former involves the legal rights 
and obligations created under a provision; the latter, the general result that 
the parties want to achieve.67 In divining object and purpose, the whole text 
of the treaty is taken into account.68 To bear on the interpretation of “nuclear 
 65. NPT, supra note 5, pmbl. ¶ 8 (emphasis added).  
 66. See JOYNER, supra note 64 (citing VCLT). 
 67. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 191-92. Importantly, the U.S. does not subscribe to 
this division, viewing the object and purpose as a single, unified consideration. See David S. 
Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive 
Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565 (2010). 
 68. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 192. 
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disarmament,” an exhaustive inquiry into the NPT’s purpose should prove 
unnecessary. The sole question is whether the proposed interpretation of 
“nuclear disarmament” clearly runs afoul of the general result the states 
parties wished to achieve. Here, partial nuclear disarmament would not 
contradict any of the relevant preambular language.69 The question posed 
with regard to the treaty’s object is not so easily disposed of, however.  
A treaty’s object involves the legal bundle of rights and obligations 
agreed to in the particular provisions of a treaty.70 Here, the states parties 
have agreed to some notion of “nuclear disarmament” in Article VI. 
Because this aspect of Article VI is squarely at issue, as an analytical 
matter, consideration of its object within the treaty is too circular to be of 
much use. Put differently, leveraging the nature of an obligation to provide 
context for understanding a particular provision is of no help if the initial 
problem is uncertainty regarding the nature of the obligation. In this 
instance, the uncertainty-generating problem is linguistic: “disarmament” 
cannot be used to clarify the meaning of “disarmament;” we do not yet 
know disarmament’s meaning. Thus, we turn to the final consideration 
under VCLT Article 31.  
D. Subsequent Agreement of the Parties  
A subsequent agreement of the parties can in certain circumstances 
derive an authentic interpretation that must thereafter be read into the initial 
treaty.71 In this case, a review conference has taken place every five years 
since the NPT’s entry into force in 1970. Though states parties did not reach 
consensus in 1980, 1990, 1995, or 2005,72 the documents agreed to in 1975, 
1985, 2000, and 2010 are instructive at least to show political commitment, 
and to “moderate” the ordinary meaning described supra, in addition to the 
NPT’s context and object and purpose.73
The 1975 review conference resulted in various references to Article VI. 
First, the conference expressed its conviction that the objective of 
preventing proliferation remained relevant to averting nuclear war, and that 
“more rapid progress was required towards cessation of the arms race and 
the ‘limitation and reduction of existing nuclear weapons with a view to 
their eventual elimination, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament . . . . ‘“74 Confirming that the parties clearly envisioned partial 
reduction steps in order to reach an end state of nuclear disarmament, the 
conference reaffirmed the undertaking of “effective measures in the 
 69. See NPT, supra note 5, pmbl.  
 70. See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 191-92.  
 71. Id. at 204-05.  
 72. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Compliance and Growth—NPT Review 
Conferences, supra note 3.  
 73. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 74. NPT 1975 Final Document, supra note 58, at 1 (emphasis added).  
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direction of nuclear disarmament.”75 Third, the conference “welcom[ing] 
the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament . . . over the last 
few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI . . . .” 76
The 1985 review conference called for the “progressive and balanced 
reduction of stockpiles . . . leading to their ultimate and complete 
elimination.”77 In addition, the conference “welcome[d] . . . bilateral 
negotiations . . . [and ] hope[d] that these negotiations will lead to early and 
effective agreements aimed at . . . limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at 
strengthening strategic stability.”78 The conference thus evinced an 
appreciation for the logical progression of partial disarmament reductions 
ultimately leading to total disarmament, as well as an understanding of the 
relevance of strategic stability.  
Although the 1995 review conference failed to yield a consensus-based 
final document, it did produce a “decision” on nuclear disarmament.79 At 
least as a political matter, the conference found important to the full 
implementation of Article VI, “[t]he determined pursuit … of systematic 
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons . . . with the ultimate 
goals of eliminating those weapons . . . .”80 Thus, the conference considered 
“progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons” critical to 
“implementation” or satisfaction of Article VI. Importantly, this relationship 
of disarmament steps to Article VI compliance received recognition again in 
2000, where the conference took the unusual step of agreeing upon 
“practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement 
article VI . . . .”81
 75. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, Aug. 27-Sept.21, 1985, Final Document, at 11, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.III/64/I, Annex I, (Sept. 25, 1985), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1985%20-%20Geneva%20-
%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 1985 Final Document]. 
 78. Id. at 13.  
 79. See Compliance and Growth—NPT Review Conferences—1995 Review and 
Extension Conference, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter04_01.html#1995 (last visited April 6, 
2011) (discussing “Decision 2, [the] ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament’”).  
 80. 1995 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, Apr. 17-May 12, 1995, Final Document, at 10, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex I, Decision 2 (June 1995), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1995%20-%20NY%20-
%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 1995 Final Document]. 
 81. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, April 24-May 19, 2000, Final Document, at 13-15, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.2000/28, (Parts I and II) (2000),  
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Welcoming what it termed “significant progress achieved in nuclear 
weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear 
disarmament,”82 the conference expressed “deep concern” with the fact that 
“despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reduction, the 
total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to 
many thousands.”83 More pointedly, however, the conference unveiled a 
disarmament wish list that included thirteen steps, four of which dealt with 
disarmament directly.84 Generally speaking, the conference restated the 
states parties’ “unequivocal undertaking . . . to accomplish the total 
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament,” while 
calling for “further reduction” and a “process leading to the total elimination 
of . . . nuclear weapons.”85
Finally, the 2010 conference noted again “with concern that the total 
estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts 
to several thousands.”86 On this issue, however, the conference failed to 
achieve consensus on disarmament progress.87 Thus, the Secretary-General 
appended a five-point proposal,88 which included: (1) multilateral 
disarmament efforts, a resumption of U.S.-Russia negotiations aimed at 
achieving deeper and verifiable reductions, and verification research and 
development; (2) P5 discussions of security issues pertinent to the 
disarmament process, such as security assurances for NNWS; (3) 
effectiveness of CTBT, FMCT and IAEA safeguards;89 (4) increased 
accountability and transparency; and (5) complementary measures regarding 
other WMD, terrorism, and conventional arms.90 Clearly undergirding this 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/2000%20%20NY%20-%20NP
T%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Parts%20I%20and%20II.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 2000 Final Document]. 
 82. Id. at 14.  
 83. Id. at 13.  
 84. See generally id. at 14-15. 
 85. Id. at 14, 15. 
 86. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, May 3-28, 2010, Final Document, at 12, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 
(Vol. I), Part I (Jun. 18, 2010), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/ 
CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I) [hereinafter NPT 2010 Final Document]. 
 87. See Compliance and Growth—NPT Review Conferences—2010 Review 
Conference, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapte 
r04_01.html#2010 (last visited April 6, 2011) (discussing the “Review of the operation of the 
Treaty”). 
 88. See id. (discussing the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for 
nuclear disarmament).  
 89. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary General, Address to the East-West Institute: The 
United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/sg5point.shtml [hereinafter Five Point 
Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament].  
 90. Id.
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proposal is a common understanding that disarmament refers to a process as 
well as an end state.  
E. VCLT Article 32—Supplementary Means  
Last, supplementary means include the preparatory work and the 
circumstances of conclusion of a treaty. Recourse to supplementary means 
of interpretation may be had either in order to confirm a meaning 
determined in accordance with the general rule in Article 31, or, to 
determine the meaning if the general rule leaves the term ambiguous.91 It is 
important to note that international tribunal decision-making in this area has 
proven somewhat opaque. While parties often reference preparatory work, 
and tribunals may call attention to such sources,92 the actual extent of 
tribunals’ reliance on such means is far from clear.93
With respect to the NPT, negotiations on disarmament consisted, more or 
less, of three positions: (1) some states insisted that the treaty list specific 
disarmament obligations binding on NWS;94 (2) other states sought to avoid 
this at all cost;95 and (3) still other states desired to add as much weight to 
the obligation of nuclear disarmament as they could without jeopardizing 
conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty.96 On disarmament, these camps in 
 91. As to whether such recourse may be had, “in almost every case involving the 
interpretation of a treaty, one or both parties seeks to invoke the preparatory work.” 
GARDINER, supra note 41, at 301. However, “[t]hat a word has various dictionary definitions, 
while raising the ordinary notion of ambiguity, does not necessarily mean that there is 
ambiguity in the sense of article 32 of the Vienna Convention.” Id. at 328. “The Vienna rules 
look to ambiguity that remains after the application of the general rule . . . of article 31 . . . . “ 
Id.
 92. See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 301, 337-39. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See U. S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS xi, xiii 
(1969) [hereinafter ACDA Negotiations Summary](discussing the original Sept. 15, 1965 
ENDC joint memorandum calling for “tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race”); see also 
id. at 87 (discussing the Burmese-proposed article containing “tangible steps toward nuclear 
disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban, a fissionable materials production cutoff, a 
halt to weapons production, a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles, and the progressive 
reduction and final destruction of stockpiles”). 
 95. See id. at xv (discussing the U.S. and the Soviet Union’s Jan. 18, 1968 
submission of identical tests of a revised draft treaty with a disarmament article that avoided 
specific disarmament measures); see also id. at 88 (noting the Soviet Ambassador’s 
expressed willingness to negotiate on nuclear disarmament measures, but without linking 
them to the treaty). Further, in response to other calls for disarmament obligations, the Soviet 
Ambassador replied “that there would be ‘definite negative consequences’ in linking 
nonproliferation to complete nuclear disarmament.” Id. at 107.  
 96. See ACDA Negotiations Summary, supra note 94, at 86-87 (discussing the 
Mexican amendment, which, though it listed specific measures, narrowed to an 
“undertak[ing] to negotiate disarmament agreements in the future”). In the Thirteenth 
Session of the ENDC, the conference noted the weakness of Article VI of the revised draft 
treaty, as compared with the Mexican amendment, because it lacked specific disarmament 
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fact entertained an entire spectrum of disarmament obligations, ranging 
from the gradual elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles,97 to a 
manufacture ban,98 total nuclear disarmament,99 and a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament.100 How each of the three negotiating positions 
ultimately came to agree upon the language in the NPT Preamble and 
Article VI is instructive, since each state proffered measures most in line 
with its initial position.  
Part of the explanation for the compromise owes to the allocation of 
bargaining power: all states parties wanted to limit the risk of “nuclear 
catastrophe” that was “bound to increase with every new addition to the 
nuclear club,”101 but the U.S. and the Soviet Union had to agree to whatever 
instrument was intended to achieve this.102 Yet, the nature of disarmament 
obligations entertained by the parties also mattered a great deal. 
Individually, proposed obligations ran the gamut from “complete nuclear 
disarmament”103 to an “undertaking of disarmament,”104 but even states that 
demanded the former recognized from the outset the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of partial disarmament and reductions.105 Thus, such piecemeal 
measures formed part of the very fabric of the bargain reached on July 1, 
1968. 
measures. However, the conference concluded that listing such measures would prove 
“counterproductive.” See id. at 106-07. Most fundamentally, U.S. Ambassador de Palma 
warned against insisting on specific and timely measures to halt vertical proliferation, 
because “[a]t this late stage in our work it would be a rather serious matter if we were asked 
to reopen the choice most of us have already made in deciding to pursue seriously . . . the 
conclusion of this treaty.” Id. at 108.  
 97. Id. at 6.  
 98. Id. at 76. 
 99. ACDA Negotiations Summary, supra note 94, at 86.  
 100. Id. at 86.  
 101. See id. at 123 (describing the United Arab Republic representative’s statements) 
(“Even with the treaty’s limitations, it is rightly assumed that the impact of concluding the 
treaty would have a favourable and far-reaching implication on all future disarmament 
negotiations.”).  
 102. See id. at 117 (The Ethiopian representative faulted, for the shortcomings of the 
treaty, “the world situation” and “the choice . . . ‘between making a little progress or no 
progress at all.’”). 
 103. See id. at 116.  
 104. ACDA Negotiations Summary, supra note 94, at 115.  
 105. See e.g., id. at 119 (While it did not insist on complete disarmament, India did 
not consider Article VI sufficiently strict in its requirement of phased disarmament.); id. at 
118 (The Brazilian Foreign Minister “saw ‘no real tangible commitment’ to nuclear 
disarmament”); id. at 113 (Britain perceived “the preambular declaration of intention on 
disarmament [as] . . . wider than article VI[,]” and thus asked the ACDA to agree that the 
review conferences would “consider whether the purposes of the preamble and the provisions 
of the treaty were [together] being realized.”).  
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F. Summary 
Synthesizing the results reached by applying VCLT Articles 31 and 32 to 
Article VI, the NPT, the product of the review conferences, and the 
preparatory work,106 several conclusions follow: 
i. The ordinary meaning of “nuclear disarmament” and Article VI 
indicate that partial disarmament steps could satisfy Article VI; 
ii. The NPT as context provides evidence that the states parties 
intended partial disarmament measures, in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, to satisfy the “nuclear disarmament” prong of Article 
VI; 
iii. Partial disarmament measures are implicit in, and not contrary, to the 
NPT’s purpose; 
iv. Nuclear disarmament refers to a process as well as an end state, and 
progress on either front helps satisfy Article VI; 
v. Reductions were originally intended as part of the fabric of Article 
VI and the NPT. 
Thus, this paper’s application of international rules of interpretation comes 
to a close, leaving only the “progressive encirclement” required of an 
independent tribunal.107 Even a quick glance at the conclusions derived 
above reveals but one legitimate interpretation of the term “nuclear 
disarmament.” It encompasses partial as well as total nuclear disarmament. 
Therefore, reductions short of total nuclear disarmament fall within its 
scope and satisfy the “nuclear disarmament” prong of Article VI.108
 106. This section omits reference to “the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion,” 
mainly because the variable is so expansive, referring to the “legal, political, and social” 
background of a treaty. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 60. Arguably, the most major 
circumstance, within this background, was Mexico’s last-minute effort to add substantive 
disarmament measures to Article VI. That such measures were rebuffed reflects Mexico’s 
ultimate satisfaction with the prevailing language of the treaty. See “The Impulse towards a 
Safer World”—40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, July 1, 2008, n.13, 
The Nuclear Vault, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/index.htm (citing MOHAMMED I. SHAKER,
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, 1959-1979 383 
(1980)). 
 107. See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 41, 59-60, 63, 144. 
 108. See NPT, supra note 5, pmbl.  
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G. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons  
Finally, in handling a matter as delicate as the interpretation of a key 
term in an international agreement, pronouncements of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) on topics relevant to that agreement warrant 
consideration. Indeed, in an oft-cited 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,109 the ICJ offered several such 
pronouncements, including the following unanimous statement: “There 
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict 
and effective international control.”110 Some consider this an “elaboration” 
on Art. VI;111 others, a call for the opinion’s enforcement.112 Regardless of 
which view prevails, the express objective of “nuclear disarmament in all its 
aspects” hardly forecloses our interpretation of “disarmament.” To the 
contrary, “nuclear disarmament in all its aspects” cannot be read to exclude 
partial disarmament steps that lead to total disarmament.  
Moreover, the real contribution this opinion ostensibly makes to nuclear 
disarmament law is that it “sets forth an obligation to bring the specified 
negotiations to a conclusion.”113 In addition, the opinion does not touch 
upon “general and complete disarmament,” the third objective expressed in 
Art. VI.114 Some leverage this omission to argue that the ICJ intended to 
remove from the field any argument that general and complete disarmament 
might somehow condition nuclear disarmament.115 This may be correct as 
far as it goes, but it merely commences the analysis undertaken in this 
paper. Nuclear disarmament encompasses partial as well as total 
disarmament, and achievement of the latter presupposes the former’s 
occurrence.  
CONCLUSION 
Thus ends the case giving legal scope for the contention that reductions, 
followed through upon, should shift diplomatic pressure onto other states. 
After all, Henry Kissinger once asked, “‘What in the name of God is 
strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, 
 109. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
 110. Id. ¶ 105(F) (cited in NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ILLEGAL: THE HISTORIC OPINION 
OF THE WORLD COURT AND HOW IT WILL BE ENFORCED 76 (Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 1998)). 
 111. VED P. NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT
113 (1998). 
 112. See NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ILLEGAL, supra note 110, at 12. 
 113. NANDA & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 113 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 113-14.  
 115. Id.
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operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’”116 This 
is what you do with it: you exchange it for durable security gain.  
Even though strategic superiority can still increase the reluctance of 
potential adversaries to initiate nuclear or other violent conflict, and can still 
achieve actual victory in nuclear or other conflict, it is equally true that 
when the number of nuclear weapons deployed rises high enough, victory in 
nuclear conflict ceases to carry much meaning. Furthermore, above a certain 
threshold, large arsenals can actually destabilize relations between nuclear-
armed states and defeat the very purpose of their deterrent mission. Thus, 
the size and characteristics of a nuclear arsenal matter: appropriate limits 
can preserve victory in some real sense, and they can prevent deterrence 
from breaking down.  
Of course, deterrence and victory still require ab initio a lower number of 
nuclear weapons controlled by hostile entities. The overarching objective is 
strategic superiority at numbers that both preserve deterrence and avoid 
nuclear holocaust. Depending on geopolitical realities, and leaving specific 
numbers for planners, at a minimum, partial disarmament steps should serve 
both victory and deterrence better than an equal measure of arms build-up 
or improvement. In response to very real concerns over giving up too much, 
it is useful to recall that “[w]orld peace [once] hinged on a stable 
relationship between the U.S. and Soviet arsenals, and . . . on apparently 
tiny details.”117 Perhaps coordinated, calculated reductions can take us back 
to an insistence on tiny details, which can drive stability just as it did during 
the Cold War. If so, then Article VI, properly understood, makes it easier 
for states to find it in their interests to observe the NPT.  
Surveying the terrain from this height, specific caps, reciprocal reduction 
ratios, and so on seem to lose much of their meaning, when full stock is 
taken of the sheer magnitude of the geopolitical challenges we confront. 
Threatening nuclear conflict and outwardly impervious to navigation, these 
will prove the crux of the twenty-first century. Though other options must 
not be discounted, clever combinations of nuclear disarmament could open 
a route through.  
 116. NICHOLAS THOMPSON, THE HAWK AND THE DOVE 245 (2009) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Henry Kissinger).  
 117. Id. at 230.  
